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Abstract
How should scholars evaluate the statistically estimated causal effect of a policy inter-
vention? I point out three limitations in the conventional practice. First, relying on
statistical significance misses the fact that uncertainty is a continuous scale. Second,
focusing on a standard point estimate overlooks variation in plausible effect sizes. Third,
the criterion of substantive significance is rarely explained or justified. To address these
issues, I propose an original Bayesian decision-theoretic model for binary outcomes. I
incorporate the posterior distribution of a causal effect reducing the likelihood of an un-
desirable event, into a loss function over the cost of a policy to realize the effect and the
cost of the event. The model can use an effect size of interest other than the standard
point estimate, and the probability of this effect as a continuous measure of uncertainty.
It then presents approximately up to what ratio between the two costs an expected loss
remains smaller if the policy is implemented than if not. I exemplify my model through
three applications and provide an R package for easy implementation.
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Policy Implications of Statistical Estimates Akisato Suzuki
1 Introduction
How should scholars evaluate the statistically estimated causal effect of a policy inter-
vention? The conventional practice looks at the statistical and substantive significance
of such a statistical estimate: whether a p-value is smaller than 5% or a 95% confi-
dence/credible interval does not include zero to reject the null hypothesis; and whether
the size of a causal effect is substantively significant to indicate practical relevance (Gross
2015; Kruschke 2018). For example, Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) report the sta-
tistical significance and “substantial” effect size of peacekeeper deployment with a peace
agreement and economic development in the aftermath of civil war to reduce the likeli-
hood of civil war recurrence, suggesting these two factors are an important policy option
for the international community to sustain peace.
I point out three limitations in this conventional practice. First, the binary decision
based on statistical significance misses the fact that uncertainty is the degree of confidence
and, therefore, a continuous scale. A statistically insignificant effect can be practically
significant if its uncertainty is low enough for practical reasons if not as low as what
the conventional threshold of statistical significance demands. The misunderstanding is
widespread that statistical insignificance means no effect (McShane and Gal 2016, 2017).
Reliance on statistical significance results in p-hacking and publication bias (Simonsohn,
Nelson, and Simmons 2014); then, statistically insignificant but practically significant
effects are likely to be overlooked or unreported, a lost opportunity.
Second, the effect size of focus to discuss substantive significance is usually the mean
even when an interval estimate is reported. Such a focus overlooks a variation in plausible
effect sizes. In terms of statistical uncertainty, some effect sizes other than the mean are
also probable. In terms of policy implications, while the mean is by definition computed
based on all probable effect sizes and their associated probabilities, some effect sizes might
be practically null values (Gross 2015; Kruschke 2018).
Third, the criterion of substantive significance is rarely explained or justified. While
some studies suggest the importance of defining practically null values (Gross 2015; Kr-
uschke 2018), they only indicate a context-specific utility/loss function should be devel-
oped and do not offer advice on how to do it. Researchers usually claim the effect size is
significant in an ad hoc way. Referring to preset criteria such as Cohen’s (Cohen 1988)
would not be desirable either, as it ignores contexts (Duncan and Magnuson 2007; Harris
2009). For example, a “1% decrease” in the likelihood of some undesirable event has dif-
ferent degrees of significance depending on what the event is (e.g., a country experiencing
a national rail strike vs. civil war).
I address these limitations, using Bayesian statistical decision theory (Baio, Berardi,
and Heath 2017; Berger 1985). I propose an original, general decision-theoretic model for
binary outcomes. Binary outcomes are one of the common types of outcome variables in
policy research and the easiest case to develop a general model. I also discuss potential
extension of the model to other types of outcome variables and why it can be more
challenging to develop a general model for these outcomes.
My model has the following advantages over the conventional practice. First, the
model uses the posterior distribution of a causal effect estimated by Bayesian statistics.
This enables the model to incorporate (1) an effect size other than a standard point
estimate and (2) its associated probability as a continuous measure of uncertainty. In
other words, the model is not limited to use only a standard point estimate as the effect
size of interest and a specific threshold of uncertainty measures such as p < 5% or a 95%
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interval. This property addresses the first two of the aforementioned limitations in the
conventional practice.
Second, the model incorporates the effect size of interest and its associated probability,
into a loss function over the cost of a policy to realize the effect and the cost of an
undesirable event (such as war). The model can then present approximately up to what
ratio between the two costs an expected loss remains smaller if the policy is implemented
than if not. An effect size is considered substantively significant up to the ratio between
the two costs where an expected loss is smaller if the policy is implemented than if not.
This property addresses the third of the aforementioned limitations in the conventional
practice.
It is often difficult to measure the costs of a specific policy and an outcome. Yet,
we can at least mathematically deduce that the cost of a policy should be smaller than
the cost of an outcome, for the policy to be worth being implemented. In other words,
the ratio of the former cost to the latter cost should be less than one. Then, we can
compute an expected loss given each of all possible ratios (e.g., .01, .02, . . . , .99) and see
up to what ratio the expected loss is smaller if the policy is implemented than if not. For
example, we might make a statement such as “We expect that the effect size of a policy
and its associated probability are large enough to produce a better outcome than that
resulting from the policy being not implemented, if the ratio of the cost of the policy to
the cost of the undesirable outcome is approximately up to .43.”
Although this may not be as informative to actual policymaking as computing an
expected loss based on properly measured costs, it is still an improvement compared to
the conventional practice. The conventional practice overlooks the cost aspects when
evaluating the effect of a policy intervention. If one claimed a causal factor worth being
implemented as a policy without the consideration of the costs, it would mean s/he is
assuming that the policy is always cost-effective. In short, the purpose of my article is
not to use my model for one specific case of policymaking, but to propose it as a better
generic way than the conventional practice to assess the effects of policy interventions.
While a model is a simplification of reality and, therefore, my decision-theoretic model
should be taken as such rather than as the absolute standard for scientific reasoning and
policymaking (e.g., see Laber and Shedden 2017), it enables richer inference than the
conventional practice (which also uses a model).
If a decision-theoretic model computes an expected loss given the estimate of a causal
effect, it means causal identification is essential for such a decision-theoretic model to
produce a reliable result. Thus, Bayesian decision theory is not a solution to the causal
identification problem. However, dismissing a decision-theoretic perspective is not a solu-
tion either; causal identification is essential for any model to discuss the effect of a policy
intervention. As the purpose of the article is to present how a decision-theoretic model
enables richer inference over the effects of policy interventions than the conventional
practice, I will not elaborate on causal identification strategy in this article. For useful
discussion on causal identification, see, for example, Herna´n and Robins (2020), Mor-
gan and Winship (2015), and Pearl, Glymour, and Jewell (2016). My decision-theoretic
model applies regardless of the types of causal effect estimate (population average, sample
average, individual, etc).
I exemplify my model through three applications in conflict research: one on the
effect of peacekeeper deployment on the likelihood of civil war recurrence (Quinn, Mason,
and Gurses 2007), another on the effect of a negative aid shock on the likelihood of
armed conflict onsets (Nielsen et al. 2011), and the other on the effect of different peace
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agreement designs on the likelihood of the agreement being supported by the public
(Tellez 2019). The first two are observational studies, while the last one is a conjoint
survey experiment. The purpose of the applications is neither to scrutinize the original
studies nor to provide any concrete policy analysis or recommendation. It is only to
illustrate how my model works in applied settings. The article concludes scholars should
use decision-theoretic models such as mine, to evaluate the effect of a policy intervention
by looking at a variation in its effect size and associated probability, and a variation in
the cost of implementing a policy and the cost of not doing so. I provide an R package
to implement my model (see the section “Supplemental Materials”).
The structure of the article is as follows. First, I briefly review the literature on
decision theory and illustrates how a decision-theoretic model works in general. Then,
I introduce my original Bayesian decision-theoretic model. Afterwards, I present the
results of the first application of my model; the results of the other two applications are
available in the supplemental document. This is followed by the discussion over how
to extend my model to outcome variables other than binary ones. Finally, concluding
remarks are stated.
2 Decision Theory
Decision theory is formal modeling of decision making. Decision theory can be differen-
tiated using two-by-two categories: descriptive vs. normative (Rapoport 1998, chap.1),
and theoretical vs. statistical (e.g., Berger 1985; Gilboa 2009). Descriptive decision the-
ory aims to explain how people do make decisions, while normative decision theory aims
to explain how people should make decisions. Theoretical decision theory assumes some
probability distribution to characterize the uncertainty of parameters, whereas statistical
decision theory uses the statistical estimates of such uncertainty, which might be Frequen-
tist p-values or Bayesian posterior distributions.1 My Bayesian decision-theoretic model
falls in the category of normative statistical decision theory, providing a way to evaluate
the statistically estimated causal effect of a policy intervention. An example of descrip-
tive statistical decision theory is Signorino (1999), who incorporates the implications of
game theory into statistical modeling. An example of Frequentist normative statistical
decision theory is the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing, where decision thresholds are
set for acceptable frequency of false positives and that of false negatives (see Gill 2015,
259–60; Lew 2012; Mudge et al. 2012).
In the literature on normative statistical decision theory, decision problems are typi-
cally framed as a loss rather than as a gain. Therefore, a loss function is a more common
way to frame decision problems than a utility function. In a loss function, a loss is a
positive value and the goal is to minimize it, while in a utility function, a gain is a
positive value and the goal is to maximize it. The difference is only framing, and it is
possible to form a loss function and a utility function in a mathematically equivalent
way. Prospect theory suggests it changes decision making whether we frame an issue at
1Unlike in the statistical literature, uncertainty in the theoretical literature means a decision
maker must choose an option out of all available options without knowing their probability
distribution (Rapoport 1998, 50). If a decision maker knows the distribution, such a situation
is called decision under “risk” (Rapoport 1998, 50). However, risk analysts often uses the term
“risk” to capture not only the probability but also the severity of an outcome (Walpole and
Wilson 2020, 2). Since this article is targeted more at applied quantitative researchers than at
theoretical decision theorists, I refer to “uncertainty” in the statistical sense of a probability
distribution.
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stake as an expected gain or as an expected loss even when it is mathematically equiva-
lent (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Yet, this is not a problem in my decision-theoretic
model, because what matters is not how much expected loss a decision produces but
which decision produces a smaller expected loss.
The general form of a loss function in Bayesian decision theory can be written:
l = L(θ, a), (1)
where l is a loss caused by action a, L(·) denotes a loss function, and θ is the parameter (or
the set of the parameters) of interest. Typically, θ is unknown and estimated as a posterior
distribution computed by Bayesian statistics; as a result l becomes the expected loss E[l].
If an action a minimizes the expected loss, it is considered as the optimal decision.
For example, if a posterior distribution over the chance of rain next week implies that
Saturday is most probable to be sunny, you should organize an outdoor event for that
Saturday to minimize the expected loss (here, disappointment by a bad weather) and not
for any other day. However, because it is only an estimate with some probability (though
the largest probability among all days), it is still possible that Saturday will turn out to
be rainy after all.
Standard loss functions include the absolute error loss, L(θ, a) = |θ − a|; the squared
error loss, L(θ, a) = (θ − a)2; and the 0-1 loss, L(θ, a) = 0 · Pr(θ = a) + 1 · Pr(θ 6= a),
where Pr(θ = a) and Pr(θ 6= a) denote the probability of an action a matching the true
state θ and that of an action a not matching the true state θ, respectively (B˚a˚ath 2015;
Berger 1985, 60–64). In words, as an action deviates further from a parameter value, the
penalty of the absolute error increases linearly (e.g., a deviation of 2 results in a loss of
2, a deviation of 4 results in a loss of 4, and so on), while the penalty of the squared
error loss increases quadratically (e.g., a deviation of 2 results in a loss of 4, a deviation
of 4 results in a loss of 16, and so on). The 0-1 loss is an extreme case: no penalty if
a decision is correct and full penalty if not, such as cutting a correct cable to defuse a
bomb (B˚a˚ath 2015).
The existing literature on normative statistical decision theory typically uses these
standard loss functions to evaluate the performance of statistical estimators, rather than
to evaluate the implications of the causal effects of policy interventions. Indeed, none
of these loss functions is flexible or versatile enough to apply to typical topics of policy
research. For example, the squared error and absolute error losses make sense only if θ
and a are measured in the same scale (e.g., θ as the estimate of how much money to
invest in US dollars, and a as the actual amount of money to invest in US dollars). And,
as clear from the “bomb” example, the 0-1 loss is too simplistic; the costs should take
more values than the two integers. Therefore, in the next section I develop an original
loss function suitable for policy research.
The approach closest to my model is normative statistical decision theory with a
utility/loss function based on the relative preference of false positive frequency over false
negative frequency – all else equal, false positive frequency and false negative frequency
are in a trade-off relationship (Esarey and Danneman 2015; Mudge et al. 2012). In theory,
this preference can be varied in the model to reflect various contexts. Yet, it has two
limitations. First, while the false positive/negative frequency is over the repetition of
the same sampling and analysis, policy implementation is often a one-shot event. The
uncertainty of such a case is better interpreted by Bayesian inference as in my model:
inference on what is the best option is made only based on available information. Second,
5
Policy Implications of Statistical Estimates Akisato Suzuki
the relative preference of false positive/negative frequency is abstract in itself. To make
it more concrete, it is useful to consider costs associated with (in)actions, as the relative
preference of false positive/negative frequency is a function of these costs. For example,
if the cost of an action is small while that of an inaction is large, a false positive may be
preferred over a false negative. In short, expected losses across costs are more intuitive
than those given a relative preference of false positive/negative frequency. My model
is not a substitute for the existing statistical decision theory but another addition to
researchers’ toolkit.
3 Proposed Model
In this section, I explain my proposed general model. It should be applicable to many
topics in policy research. Yet, no single model would serve every purpose perfectly, and
fine-tuning would often be necessary on a case-by-case basis. The model should serve as
a starting point for others to adopt and adapt for their purposes if necessary.
3.1 Bayesian statistics
Before explaining the model, I briefly summarize Bayesian statistics as a prerequisite.
In Bayesian statistics, parameters are random variables. Thus, a parameter value has a
probability density/mass accompanying it. A posterior is the probability distribution of
a parameter given data, p(θ|D), where θ and D are general letters to denote a parameter
(or a set of parameters) and data respectively. In this article, the parameter of interest
is the one for a causal effect. θ denotes such a parameter in the rest of the article.
Bayesian statistics computes the posterior p(θ|D), by multiplying the prior p(θ) – i.e.,
the probability distribution of a parameter before seeing data, and the likelihood p(D|θ)
– i.e., the data distribution given the parameter, and then dividing the product by the
marginal likelihood p(D) =
∫
p(D|θ∗)p(θ∗)dθ∗, where θ∗ denotes every value that the
parameter θ can take (Gelman et al. 2013, 6–7; the notation θ∗ is taken from Kruschke
2015, 107). Formally:
p(θ|D) = p(D|θ)p(θ)∫
p(D|θ∗)p(θ∗)dθ∗ . (2)
How to specify a prior is beyond the scope of this article. I simply state it is possible
(1) to specify a prior that lets the likelihood dominate (the so-called “noninformative”
or “weakly informative” priors), and (2) to tune a prior based on our scientific knowl-
edge (the so-called “informative” priors). For more details, see, for example, Gelman et
al. (2013, 51–56) and Gill (2015, chap. 4). Note the implicit assumption that a posterior
is conditional not only on data but also on model specifications such as a prior setting,
causal identification strategy, an estimator choice, a functional form, and so on. For sim-
plicity and to follow the convention, this article will not notate this model dependence of
a posterior explicitly and will implicitly assume it.
3.2 Loss function
Let Cp be the cost of implementing a policy and Ce be the cost of an undesirable event
taking place. Ce is realized probabilistically. Celogit
−1(pi) is the cost of the event times
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the baseline likelihood of it taking place (i.e., without the policy being implemented),
where logit−1(·) is the inverse logit function mapping log odds onto a probability, and pi
is the baseline log odds. To avoid confusion, I use “likelihood” to refer to the probability
of an event and “probability” to refer to the probability that a causal factor affects an
outcome.
I propose the following loss function:
E[l] = CpI(i) + Celogit−1(pi + pθintI(i) + qθunintI(i)), (3)
where θint is the size of the intended effect of a causal factor, i.e., reducing the likelihood
of an undesirable event (thus, θint < 0 by definition); p is the probability of θint; θunint is
the size of the unintended effect of the causal factor, i.e., increasing or having no effect on
the likelihood of the undesirable event (thus, θunint ≥ 0 by definition); q is the probability
of θunint; I(i) is an indicator function taking 1 if the causal factor is implemented as a
policy and 0 if not. If a policy is not implemented (i.e., I(i) = 0), the expected loss
is the cost of the event weighted by the baseline likelihood, logit−1(pi), for example, the
cost of civil war weighted by its baseline likelihood. If a policy is implemented (i.e.,
I(i) = 1), the expected loss is the cost of implementing the policy plus the cost of the
event weighted by the revised likelihood, logit−1(pi + pθint + qθunint). For example, if
pθint = −0.1 and qθunint = 0.02, then the revised likelihood of the undesirable event is
logit−1(pi + (−0.1) + 0.02).
pθint and qθunint are derived from the posterior of the causal effect parameter, p(θ|D).
Both terms are necessary ex ante to define the loss function, because if the posterior has
both negative and positive values, it means this causal factor can be probable to decrease
or increase the likelihood of the same undesirable event. If a policy realized the intended
effect, the situation would improve; if the policy turned out to realize the unintended
effect, the situation would deteriorate. If the policy turned out to have the null effect, it
would still be undesirable because of the cost of the policy being wasted.
Indeed, the point of a posterior is to capture the uncertainty over θ. If the likelihood
of an undesirable event were to be reduced, the negative values of θ would capture the
intended effect, θint, while the null and positive values of θ would capture the unintended
effect, θunint. Because a posterior is a probability distribution, these positive and negative
values need to be weighted by their probabilities: hence, pθint and qθunint. In the next
subsection, I explain exactly how to specify these two terms.
In the special case where the posterior of θ has only negative values, q = 0 and
qθunintI(i) disappears from the loss function. Similarly, in the special case where the
posterior of θ has only positive values, p = 0 and pθintI(i) disappears from the loss
function.
It might be argued why the model does not use just the mean of a posterior rather
than dividing the posterior into the negative and positive values. This is because the
mean is just a special case of specifying pθint and qθunint, as I explain in the following
subsection.
3.3 How to specify pθint and qθunint
To specify the sizes of the intended and unintended effects of a causal factor and their
associated probabilities, we need to summarize the posterior as a scalar. As for θint,
we can use the mean over the range −∞ < θ ≤ θm.d., where θm.d. is some minimum
7
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desired effect size by which the likelihood of an undesirable event is reduced (therefore,
θm.d. < 0 by definition). It follows that p is the probability mass of this range. Formally:
pθint = P (θ ≤ θm.d.|D)E[θ ≤ θm.d.|D]. Informally, this quantity summarizes all desired
effect sizes weighted by their probability.
As for θunint, we can use the mean over the range θm.u. ≤ θ < +∞, where θm.u. is some
minimum undesired effect size by which the likelihood of an undesirable event is increased
or not changed (therefore, θm.u. ≥ 0 by definition). It follows that q is the probability
mass of this range. Formally: qθunint = P (θ ≥ θm.u.|D)E[θ ≥ θm.u.|D]. Informally, this
quantity summarizes all undesired effect sizes weighted by their probability.
If θm.d. < − (where  is an infinitesimal value) and/or θm.u. > 0, the non-null values
between θm.d. and θm.u. are the region of practically null values (Gross 2015; Kruschke
2018). The mean of the entire posterior is a special case, where there is no region of
practically null values: i.e., the effect sizes of interest are θm.d. = − and θm.u. = 0 so that
pθint + qθunint = P (θ ≤ −|D)E[θ ≤ −|D] + P (θ ≥ 0|D)E[θ ≥ 0|D] = E[θ|D].
I suggest we do not preset the values of θm.d. and θm.u., unless we are applying the
model to a particular policymaking context and know the values of θm.d. and θm.u.. Oth-
erwise, the preset values would be as arbitrary as the statistical significance of p < 5%.
This is why the loss function has pθint and qθunint separately, rather than the mean of
the posterior only, which would preset θm.d. = − and θm.u. = 0. We can vary θm.d. and
θm.u. to see how the results change with respect to the comparison between the expected
loss given the implementation of a policy and the one given no such implementation.
Figure 1 is graphical examples of what pθint and qθunint capture. The density plot is
made of 10,000 draws from a normal distribution with the mean of −0.5 and the standard
deviation of 0.5. Let us assume the distribution is posterior samples. In the left panel,
I set θm.d. = − and θm.u. = 0 for exposition. For pθint, the mean over the range of the
effect size being smaller than zero is indicated by the solid vertical line and its associated
probability mass by the shaded area. Formally, pθint = p(θ < 0|D)E[θ < 0|D] ≈ −0.55.
For qθunint, the mean over the range of the effect size being equal to or greater than
zero is indicated by the dashed vertical line and its associated probability mass by the
white-shaded area. Formally, qθunint = p(θ ≥ 0|D)E[θ ≥ 0|D] ≈ 0.04.
In the right panel, I set θm.d. = −0.5 and θm.u. = 0.5, again for exposition. For pθint,
the mean over the range of the effect size being equal to or smaller than −0.5 is indicated
by the solid vertical line and its associated probability mass by the grey-shaded area.
Formally, pθint = p(θ ≤ −0.5|D)E[θ ≤ −0.5|D] ≈ −0.46. For qθunint, the mean over
the range of the effect size being equal to or greater than 0.5 is indicated by the dashed
vertical line and its associated probability mass by the white-shaded area. Formally,
qθunint = p(θ ≥ 0.5|D)E[θ ≥ 0.5|D] ≈ 0.02. The black-shaded area is the region of
presumed practically null values.
3.4 How to define Cp and Ce
We can define Cp and Ce so that we estimate the expected loss given a full range of the
ratio of Cp to Ce while assuming these costs are measured in the same scale. For example,
we vary the ratio of Cp to Ce from 0.01 up to 1, holding Cp at 1 while changing the value
of Ce from 1 to 100 and assuming that these two costs are measured in the same scale
that takes a value between 1 and 100.2 Then, we can make an argument such as “We
2Strictly speaking, it would be unnecessary to consider the case where the ratio of the two
costs is one, because such a case would make no difference between the implementation of a
8
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Figure 1: Graphical example of pθint and qθunint. In the left panel, the grey-shaded area is
where the parameter value < 0; the white-shaded area is where the parameter value ≥ 0. In the
right panel, the grey-shaded area is where the parameter value ≤ −0.5; the black-shaded area
is the region of presumed practically null values; the white-shaded area is where the parameter
value ≥ 0.5. The solid vertical line is the mean within the grey-shaded area; the dashed vertical
line is the mean within the white-shaded area.
expect that the treatment effect size and its associated probability are large enough to
produce a better outcome than that resulting from the treatment being not used, if the
ratio of the cost of the treatment to the cost of the undesirable outcome is approximately
up to .43.”
It is an important future study how to measure Cp and Ce in each applied context, to
make the model inform policymaking in that particular context. There are two caveats
when one specifies Cp and Ce based on measured costs. First, these costs must be
measured in the same scale to make the loss function internally consistent. Second, Cp
must not be weighted by the benefit that a specific policy would bring about; Ce must
not be weighted by the likelihood of an undesirable event. Both the benefit and the
likelihood are quantities estimated by Bayesian statistics, which are pθint and logit
−1(pi+
pθintI(i) + qθunintI(i)), respectively. Therefore, these quantities should not be used when
one defines Cp and Ce.
Costs in policymaking contexts are often multidimensional and unobservable. For
example, a cost to a policymaker may be different from the one to the general public; a
cost may include not only a financial but also a political and/or social cost. It is thus
challenging to measure Cp and Ce. However, ignoring the costs, as in the conventional
practice, is not a solution either. If one claimed a causal factor worth being implemented
as a policy without the consideration of the costs, it would essentially assume that the
policy is always cost-effective. Such an assumption may not always be true.
3.5 Statistical setup
pi, θint, and θunint should be measured in a log odds scale, because they are terms inside the
inverse logit function. Thus, a Bayesian logistic regression model is suitable to estimate
the posterior of pi and that of θ. If the variable of a causal factor is binary, parameter
values of its posterior can be used directly to define θint and θunint. If the variable is
continuous, θint and θunint can be defined as the parameter values of the posterior times
policy and no such implementation even if the policy reduced the likelihood of an undesirable
event to zero. Thus, the meaningful ratio is up to 1− .
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the size of the unit change of interest (e.g., a million US dollar increase in foreign aid).
There are three practical prerequisites in setting up a Bayesian logistic regression
model. First, the value of 1 in the binary outcome variable must mean something unde-
sirable, so that a reduction in the baseline likelihood, logit−1(pi), reduces Ce; otherwise,
the loss function would not work properly. For example, if the outcome of interest is the
termination of civil war, the dependent variable should be coded 1 for no termination
and 0 for termination, so that the baseline likelihood of civil war going on is reduced
from Celogit
−1(pi) to Celogit
−1(pi + pθint + qθunint), provided that pθint + qθunint < 0, of
course. The application of my model to Tellez (2019) in the supplemental document also
exemplifies this practical point.
Second, as the implication of the first point, the causal variable of interest must be
coded so that a greater value captures a greater effect to reduce the likelihood of an
undesirable event. For example, if the outcome of interest is the onset of armed conflict
and the causal variable of interest is a binary indicator of a sudden drop in foreign aid
that is theoretically expected to increase the likelihood of the onset (Nielsen et al. 2011),
then the causal variable must have a value of 0 for the presence of a sudden drop in
foreign aid and a value of 1 for its absence. The application of my model to Nielsen
et al. (2011) in the supplementary document also exemplifies this point.
Third, if there are more than one explanatory variable, we must decide the log odds
ratio coefficient of which variable to use to specify pθint and qθunint, while leaving those
of the other variables absorbed to pi. It is the same logic as when we estimate a predicted
probability; we manipulate the value of the explanatory variable of interest while leaving
the remaining explanatory variables at some fixed values. We might use the mean of
the empirical distribution of these variables to simulate the “average” case within data.
Or, if one had in her/his mind a specific case to which the decision-theoretic model is
applied, those explanatory variables might be held at the values that represent that case.
All applications in this article take the former approach.
4 Application
I apply my Bayesian decision-theoretic model to three conflict studies as examples. In this
section, I use a study by Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007), which examines the effects
of several factors on the likelihood of civil war recurrence. Among them, I focus on the
effect of peacekeeper deployment after a peace agreement; the original study found that it
on average reduces the likelihood of civil war recurrence. In the supplemental document,
I apply my decision-theoretic model to Nielsen et al. (2011) and Tellez (2019), and use
these studies as examples where we need to reverse the coding of the original variables of
interest in the statistical models to make the loss function work properly. I do not intend
to scrutinize the validity of the original studies or present a decision-theoretic model to
help policymaking on these topics in general. The applications are only for illustrative
purposes, and I take the original empirical models and causal identification strategies for
granted. All statistical analysis was done in R (R Core Team 2020).
4.1 Statistical model
The original study’s research design is as follows (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, 182).
The unit of analysis is the episodes of 116 civil wars since the year of 1944 that ended
before 1997. The dependent variable is a binary variable, taking 1 if a country where
10
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a civil war ended experienced another civil war; 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables
are four categories of the outcome of the last civil war: a government victory, a rebel
victory, a peace agreement with peacekeeper deployment, and a peace agreement without
peacekeeper deployment; three categories of the last civil war: ethnic secessionist war,
ethnic revolution, and ideological revolution; the natural log of fatalities in the last civil
war; the natural log of the duration of the last civil war; the size of the government’s
army as a percentage to the population; the Polity score in two years after the last civil
war ended; post-war GDP per capita; post-war infant mortality rate; the natural log of
the post-war population; years since the last civil war ended.
Of these explanatory variables, I focus as the treatment variable on the category of a
peace agreement with peacekeeper deployment, while using as the baseline the category
of a peace agreement without peacekeeper deployment in the four types of the outcome of
the last civil war. In other words, the policy decision is whether to deploy peacekeepers
into the countries where civil war ended with a peace agreement.
The original study uses the classical logistic regression. I use the equivalent Bayesian
logistic regression model:
yi ∼ Bernoulli(logit−1(β0 + β1di + xiγ)), (4)
where the subscript i indicates every episode of post-civil war in the dataset; yi is the
dependent variable taking 0 or 1; β0 is the constant; β1 is the log odds ratio for di, the
treatment indicator taking 0 (no peacekeeper deployment after a peace agreement) or 1
(peacekeeper deployment after a peace agreement); and xiγ is the dot product of the
vector of the remaining explanatory variables xi and that of the corresponding log odds
coefficients γ. This setup means the effect of peacekeeper deployment is the one averaged
within the data.
The posteriors are estimated by the MCMC method via Stan (Stan Development
Team 2019), implemented via the rstanarm package (Goodrich et al. 2020). I use 10,000
iterations for each of four chains; the first 1,000 iterations are discarded.
I use a weakly informative prior of Normal(0, log(10)) for the beta coefficients of all
explanatory variables. The scales of these priors are then automatically adjusted based on
the measurement scale of each variable by the rstanarm package (Goodrich et al. 2020). I
use a weakly informative prior of Normal(0, 10) for the constant; the mean of zero makes
sense, as the rstanarm package automatically centers all predictors during the estimation
process – the returned results are in the original scales (Goodrich et al. 2020). The weakly
informative priors lead to more data-driven but also regularized Bayesian estimation. I
use these priors here for reference purposes only; if informative priors were available, one
should use them.
4.2 Applying the loss function
As mentioned above, I focus on the effect of the presence of peacekeepers in comparison
to the lack thereof, when the last civil war ended with a peace agreement. In other words,
a policy option is either deploying peacekeepers or not after a peace agreement.
Let the cost of deploying peacekeepers be Cp.k. and the cost of civil war recurrence be
Cc.w.r.. Applying my loss function, we have:
E[l] = Cp.k.I(i) + Cc.w.r.logit−1(pi + pβ1intI(i) + qβ1unintI(i)), (5)
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where β1int is the size of the intended effect of peacekeepers, i.e., to reduce the likelihood
of civil war recurrence (β1int < 0); p is its associated probability; β1unint is the size of the
unintended effect of peacekeepers, i.e., to increase or have no effect on the likelihood of
civil war recurrence (β1unint ≥ 0); q is its associated probability; I(i) is an indicator func-
tion taking 1 if peacekeepers are deployed and 0 if not. The expected loss if peacekeepers
are not deployed is the cost of civil war recurrence weighted by the baseline likelihood of
civil war recurrence; the expected loss if peacekeepers are deployed is the cost of deploying
peacekeepers plus the cost of civil war recurrence weighted by its revised likelihood.
pi, p, β1int, q and β1unint are estimated based on the Bayesian logistic regression. pi is
the mean over the sum of (1) the empirical distributions of xi times the posterior means of
their corresponding log odds coefficients in γ and (2) the posterior mean of the constant
β0, except that the values of the variables of a rebel victory and a government victory are
set at zero as the logical consequence of the treatment category being a peace agreement
with peacekeepers and the baseline category being one without peacekeepers.
4.3 Results
First, the Rˆ turned out to be approximately 1.00 for all parameters, suggesting the
Bayesian logistic regression did not fail to converge. The mean and 95% credible interval,
as the conventional practice to evaluate the policy implications of statistical estimates,
would lead us to conclude that the effect of peacekeeper deployment is statistically in-
significant, as the 95% credible interval includes zero (see Table 1).3 If this statistical
insignificance were interpreted as giving no evidence for peacekeeper deployment reducing
the likelihood of civil war recurrence, it could result in a lost opportunity, depending on
the effect size of interest, its associated probability, and the cost of peacekeeper deploy-
ment and that of civil war recurrence.
Mean Lower bound Upper bound
-1.56 -3.43 0.24
Table 1: Mean and 95% credible interval of the average effect of peacekeeper deployment.
N = 111, Rˆ ≈ 1.00 for all parameters.
First, let us focus on the point about the effect size of interest and its probability.
There is no imperative to use the decision threshold of 95% to evaluate the uncertainty of
statistical estimates in a binary way. We can compute the probabilities of different effect
sizes in a continuous scale. Figure 2 presents with how much probability peacekeeper de-
ployment is expected to reduce the likelihood of civil war recurrence to a certain amount.
The figure illustrates how the degree of statistical uncertainty changes depending on the
desired effect size, while the cost of policy implementation and the cost of an undesirable
event are assumed to be constant.
The probability that peacekeeper deployment is expected to reduce the likelihood of
civil war recurrence is 95%, when the size of the intended effect in the loss function, β1int,
is defined as E[β1 < 0|D].4 This effect size reduces the likelihood of civil war recurrence
3The original study finds the statistically significant effect of peacekeeper deployment, but
this is because it uses the category of government victory as the baseline category. As noted
above, I compare the presence of peacekeepers after a peace agreement with the lack thereof.
4The reason the 95% credible interval includes zero in Table 1 is that the credible interval
is a two-tailed measure while the probability P (β1 < 0|D) is a one-tailed measure.
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Figure 2: Likelihood of civil war recurrence and the probability of the average effect of peace-
keepers. Baseline likelihood of civil war recurrence: 26%.
from the baseline likelihood 26% to 6%. The probability decreases, if the effect size is
desired to be larger, i.e., given a greater negative value of β1m.d. in E[β1 < β1m.d.|D], where
β1m.d. denotes the minimum desired effect size of peacekeeper deployment. For example,
if one wants to expect a reduction in the likelihood of civil war recurrence to 2%, the
probability of peacekeeper deployment having such an effect is approximately 21%. If
one wants to expect a reduction to 1%, the probability of peacekeeper deployment having
such an effect is just 5%. In other words, the probability that peacekeeper deployment is
expected to reduce the likelihood of civil war recurrence depends on how much reduction
is desired.
To examine how this point feeds into the loss function, I estimate expected losses
in the following way. First, as for pβ1int, I change the value of β1int by using the log
of the odds ratio 0.5, 0.25, 0.1, or 0.05 as the minimum desired effect size β1m.d. (and,
accordingly, its associated probability p also changes).5 Second, as for qβ1unint, I use
a value of zero for the minimum undesired effect size β1m.u., i.e., E[β1 ≥ 0|D]; q is its
associated probability. Third, I change the ratio of Cp.k. to Cc.w.r. from 0.01 to 1, holding
Cp.k. at 1 while varying the value of Cc.w.r. from 1 to 100.
6
The results are displayed in Figure 3 across the different odds ratio values for β1m.d..
In each figure, the x-axis is the ratio of Cp.k. to Cc.w.r.. The y-axis is the expected loss. The
black dots are the expected losses given I(i) = 1, i.e., when peacekeepers are presumed to
be deployed; the gray dots are those given I(i) = 0, i.e., when peacekeepers are presumed
not to be deployed.
In the top left panel of Figure 3, where an odds ratio of 0.5 is used to define β1m.d., the
5These odds ratios define the minimum expected likelihood of civil war recurrence as ap-
proximately 15%, 8%, 3%, and 2%.
6It might be argued that Cc.w.r. is infinite at least to the affected country, if not to the
international community or to the sender of peacekeepers. However, if that were the case, any
policy that reduces the likelihood of civil war recurrence to whatever degrees would become
rational. To the best of my knowledge, no government has proposed such a drastic measure,
suggesting that it is recognized that the cost of such a drastic measure exceeds the cost of civil
war recurrence and, therefore, the latter cost is finite.
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Figure 3: Expected losses over different ratios of the costs. The black dots are the expected
losses given peacekeeper deployment; the gray dots are those given no peacekeeper deployment.
expected losses are smaller when peacekeepers are deployed than when it is not, if Cp.k.
is small compared to Cc.w.r.. Meanwhile, as the ratio of the costs becomes higher, the
expected losses become larger when peacekeepers are deployed than when they are not.
More precisely, such a crossover takes place when the ratio of the costs is approximately
0.188. If a smaller odds ratio is used to define β1m.d., such a crossover occurs at a smaller
value of the ratio of the costs, as shown through the top right, bottom left, and bottom
right panels of the figure. In short, whether deploying peacekeepers is the optimal choice
depends on (1) the desired size of reduction in the likelihood of civil war recurrence, (2)
its associated probability, and (3) the relative value of Cp.k. to Cc.w.r.. Using my Bayesian
decision-theoretic model, we can see approximately up to what ratio of Cp.k. to Cc.w.r.
peacekeeper deployment remains the optimal choice (i.e., produces a smaller expected
loss).7 This is richer inference over the implications of the effect of a policy intervention,
7It is the approximation for two reasons. First, the ratio of the costs is not so finely scaled
here. Second, and more importantly, there is uncertainty over the model and, therefore, over
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than the conventional practice using only effect sizes and uncertainty measures.
While the above discussion is about the general implications of the effect of a policy
intervention, one could also consider its implications for a specific policymaking context
if information about relevant actors’ preference were available. Here, I discuss two points
to be considered. First, a desired effect size may be endogenous to the ratio of the cost
of a policy to the cost of an undesirable outcome. In the current example, if the cost
of deploying peacekeepers were small, policymakers might think the odds ratio of 0.5 is
enough, whereas if the cost of deploying peacekeepers were large, they might think the
odds ratio of 0.05 is necessary to justify such a high-cost policy. It should be noted that a
process to define the effect size of interest given the costs is outside the statistical model
(French and Argyris 2018). Thus, the endogeneity between the effect size of interest and
the costs does not affect the statistical estimation.
Second, the costs may well differ across actors. In the current example, some coun-
tries may have better capacity to send peacekeepers efficiently than others. The cost of
deploying peacekeepers is then lower to the former than to the latter. Similarly, policy-
makers in some countries may be more concerned with civil war recurrence than those
in other countries, for example, neighboring countries vs. distant countries. The cost of
civil war recurrence is then greater to the former than to the latter.
Whether one refers to a specific policymaking context or not, the main conclusion
from my model does not change. Whether a policy (deploying peacekeepers in the current
example) is an optimal choice depends on the desired level of reduction in the likelihood
of an undesirable event (civil war recurrence in the example), the probability of the policy
achieving this level of reduction, and the cost of the policy and the cost of the undesirable
event.
5 Extension to Other Types of Outcome Variables
It is possible to modify my model so that it can be applied to outcome variables other
than a binary one. The simplest case is where an outcome variable is continuous, and all
of the variables, the cost of implementing a policy, and the cost of not implementing the
policy are measured in the same scale (e.g., in monetary terms). In such a case, the loss
function is simply:
E[l] = CpI(i) + (Cs + pθintI(i) + qθunintI(i)), (6)
where Cs is the cost of the status quo situation. For example, a government might be
losing money every year for energy inefficiency in the building; the installation of new
insulation would cost some money but could result in a lower expected financial loss than
that resulting from no such installation, through greater energy efficiency.
However, many outcomes in policy research are beyond monetary terms, and are not
simple continuous variables either (e.g., a count variable, a censored variable, or a time-
to-event variable). For example, one might be interested in the effect of foreign aid on
the level of democracy (for example, measured by the 0 to 10 Polity scale, Marshall
2014). In such a case, pθint and qθunint capture the effect size of foreign aid on the level
of democracy, weighed by its probability. If equation 6 were used, Cp and Cs would have
to be measured based on the level of democracy, which would be absurd. Thus, in cases
the point of the crossover in the expected losses (Laber and Shedden 2017, 903).
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like this, some function needs to be developed to convert pθint and qθunint to the same
scale as Cp and Cs. Formally:
E[l] = CpI(i) + (Cs + f(pθintI(i) + qθunintI(i))). (7)
The functional form for f(·) may well be context-dependent. Future research could
develop a general functional form for a particular type of outcome variables.
6 Conclusion
This article has introduced Bayesian statistical decision theory as a framework to evaluate
the implications of the statistically estimated causal effects of policy interventions. I have
introduced a general Bayesian decision-theoretic model for binary outcomes as a starting
point for applied researchers to use and modify if necessary. The application of my model
to conflict research has exemplified the utility of my model. In short, whether a causal
effect should be implemented as a policy to reduce the likelihood of an undesirable event,
depends on the effect size of interest, its associated probability, and the costs of the policy
and of the event. My model provides richer information about the implications of the
effects of policy interventions, than the conventional practice using only the standard
point estimate and (categorical) uncertainty measures.
While my model focuses on research on policy interventions, it also has implications
for non-policy research. It might be argued that non-policy research should use common
criteria in the academic community, such as p < 5% and Cohen’s effect size measure
(Cohen 1988), to detect an academically meaningful effect, and should be agnostic about
a utility/loss function for policymaking. There are two issues to be considered, how-
ever. First, the purpose of non-policy research is the accumulation of knowledge. It is
well-known that the common criterion of p < 5% has led to a skewed distribution of
knowledge – the so-called publication bias (Esarey and Wu 2016; Gerber and Malhotra
2008; Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons 2014). Second, there is no clear consensus over
what an academically meaningful effect size is. Indeed, it is unclear how one can define
an effect size meaningful without reference to practical contexts. One way out from these
two issues is to use a general decision-theoretic model, such as mine, that treats the
continuous nature of statistical uncertainty as such and evaluates effect sizes based on a
general loss function.
Future research can be done to improve the usefulness of my Bayesian decision-
theoretic model. First, if more than one model specification is plausible (which is usually
the case), there is uncertainty over the crossover point where an expected loss is smaller
if the policy is implemented than if not. We can model such uncertainty by running all
conceivable models and aggregate the results, with weighting if necessary (e.g., Bayesian
model averaging, Montgomery and Nyhan 2010).
Second, it is possible that a policy influences more than one outcome. In the example
on civil war recurrence, the model considers only the (average) effect of peacekeepers
that reduces the likelihood of civil war recurrence. In fact, peacekeepers, and many
other policies, can affect multiple things. Thus, the benefit peacekeepers are expected to
bring may not be limited to a reduction in the likelihood of civil war recurrence. It is
also possible that peacekeepers have an adverse effect on other things (e.g., Nord˚as and
Rustad 2013). To incorporate the effect of a policy intervention on multiple outcomes,
the empirical model per outcome could be estimated, and then each decision-theoretic
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model per empirical model could be aggregated.
Third, decision analysis does not have to be a one-shot event. If a policy were actually
implemented, a follow-up analysis would be useful to see whether the policy actually had
an intended effect as expected by the decision-theoretic model. The Bayesian part of
decision theory makes this easy. The follow-up analysis could use the actual consequence
of the policy as new data and the last posterior estimate as a new prior in Bayesian
estimation, thereby updating the posterior estimate and the expected losses.
Finally, if a decision-theoretic model should serve actual policymaking, it is essential
to establish how to measure the costs, which are usually unobservable and difficult to
quantify. One possible option is to develop a Bayesian empirical model to estimate the
costs and incorporate the uncertainty of these estimates via their posteriors. This would
enable even richer inference in a decision-theoretic model.
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